论文标题
机理设计，可预测令人讨厌的设施位置
Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了对令人讨厌的设施位置问题的预测机制设计。我们提出了确定性的策略性防止机制，这些机制在细分，正方形，圆圈和树木的稳健性和一致性之间表现出权衡。除了正方形的情况外，所有这些机制实际上都是群体防护的，那里存在两个代理联盟的操作。我们证明，在1维情况下，这些权衡是最佳的。
We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.
