论文标题
在区域间泄漏下取消二氧化碳的最佳定价
Optimal pricing for carbon dioxide removal under inter-regional leakage
论文作者
论文摘要
二氧化碳去除（CDR）将大气碳移至地质或陆基水槽。在第一最好的环境中，CDR的最佳使用是通过等于最佳碳税和边际损害的删除补贴来实现的。当不存在全球碳价格时，我们将根据CDR补贴和碳税获得第二好的政策规则，但国家政府实施单方面的气候政策。我们发现，由于碳泄漏和资源贸易效应的平衡，最佳的碳税与最佳CDR补贴有所不同。首先，由于化石资源市场上的供应方泄漏较低，最佳取消补贴往往大于碳税。其次，净碳出口商加剧了这种楔形，以增加其碳资源生产商的生产者盈余，这意味着更大的去除补贴。第三，当边际环境损失很小时，净碳进口商甚至可以将其取消补贴设置为碳税，以使碳出口商的适当生产者剩余。
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best policy rules for CDR subsidies and carbon taxes when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage and a balance of resource trade effect. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, net carbon exporters exacerbate this wedge to increase producer surplus of their carbon resource producers, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, net carbon importers may set their removal subsidy even below their carbon tax when marginal environmental damages are small, to appropriate producer surplus from carbon exporters.
