论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordination and equilibrium selection
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了多层网络上的两人配位游戏中同步，协调和均衡选择的机制。我们将进化游戏理论的方法应用于三个可能的更新规则：复制器动力学（RD），最佳响应（BR）和无条件模仿（UI）。玩家在两层随机的常规网络上进行互动。每一层上的人群都玩不同的游戏，我偏爱相反的策略而不是第二层。我们测量了在层上玩的两个游戏之间的差异，而相互连接的收益$δs$的差异是通过节点重叠参数$ q $来衡量的。我们发现一个临界值$ q_c（δs）$以下，而层不同步。对于$ q>> q_c $，一般两层都在相同的策略上协调。令人惊讶的是，在选择平衡时存在对称性破坏 - 对于RD和UI，在一个相位仅选择收益为主的平衡。我们的工作是一个以前观察到的单个网络上更新规则之间差异的示例。但是，我们采取了一种新颖的方法，游戏是在两个相互连接的层上进行的。如我们所示，多层结构可以通过模仿的更新规则在协调游戏中增强了帕累托最佳平衡的丰富度。
We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). Players interact on a two-layer random regular network. The population on each layer plays a different game, with layer I preferring the opposite strategy to layer II. We measure the difference between the two games played on the layers by a difference in payoffs $ΔS$ while the inter-connectedness is measured by a node overlap parameter $q$. We discover a critical value $q_c(ΔS)$ below which layers do not synchronise. For $q>q_c$ in general both layers coordinate on the same strategy. Surprisingly, there is a symmetry breaking in the selection of equilibrium -- for RD and UI there is a phase where only the payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected. Our work is an example of previously observed differences between the update rules on a single network. However, we took a novel approach with the game being played on two inter-connected layers. As we show, the multilayer structure enhances the abundance of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in coordination games with imitative update rules.
