论文标题
在不确定性下线性合同的近似最佳性
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个隐藏行动的主体代理模型，其中行动需要不同的努力，而代理商则私下知道他的能力决定了他的努力成本。我们表明，线性合同承认近似可以通过自然指标来改进，从而捕获合同环境中不确定性的程度。因此，我们表明，只要有足够的不确定性，线性合同几乎是最佳的。相反，即使有足够的不确定性，诸如债务合同等其他简单合同格式（例如债务合同）也可能遭受线性损失。
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort. We show that linear contracts admit approximation guarantees that improve with a natural metric that captures the degree of uncertainty in the contracting setting. We thus show that linear contracts are near-optimal whenever there is enough uncertainty. In contrast, other simple contract formats such as debt contracts may suffer from a loss linear in the number of possible actions, even when there is sufficient uncertainty.
