论文标题
组的自发出现和动态网络中的信号多样性
Spontaneous emergence of groups and signaling diversity in dynamic networks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究网络结构和信号传导行为的共同进化。我们建模可以在动态网络中优先与他人相关联的代理人，同时还可以学习玩一个简单的发送者游戏游戏。我们有四个主要发现。首先，即使在最初的均匀种群中，动态网络中的信号传导相互作用足以引起不同信号组的内源形成。其次，动态网络允许不在单个公共信号系统上收敛但由不同但互补的信号传导策略组成的新颖{\ em混合}信号组的出现。我们表明，这些杂种群的存在促进了人群中其他群体的信号传导的稳定多样性。第三，我们发现不同组的信息处理能力的重要区别：最初更快地扩散信息，但要花费更长的时间才能吸引所有组成员。第四，我们的发现与所有共同的兴趣信号游戏有关，在许多参数中都是强大的，并减轻了已知的沟通效率低下的问题。
We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major findings. First, signaling interactions in dynamic networks are sufficient to cause the endogenous formation of distinct signaling groups, even in an initially homogeneous population. Second, dynamic networks allow the emergence of novel {\em hybrid} signaling groups that do not converge on a single common signaling system but are instead composed of different yet complementary signaling strategies. We show that the presence of these hybrid groups promotes stable diversity in signaling among other groups in the population. Third, we find important distinctions in information processing capacity of different groups: hybrid groups diffuse information more quickly initially but at the cost of taking longer to reach all group members. Fourth, our findings pertain to all common interest signaling games, are robust across many parameters, and mitigate known problems of inefficient communication.
