论文标题
出售多种商品的单调机制
Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
论文作者
论文摘要
显示出两家或更多商品的最大收入已被证明需要使用$非单调$机制，在这种情况下，高价值买方的支付可能比低评估的购买者低。在这里，我们表明，限制$单调$机制可能不仅降低了收入，而且实际上只能产生$可忽略的$ $ $ $ $ $分数$的最大收入；更确切地说，单调机制的收入不超过可通过单独出售商品或捆绑商品（k是货物数量）获得的简单收入的K倍，而最大收入可能更大。然后，我们研究单调机制的类别及其分配单调机制的子类，并获得有用的特征和收入范围。
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonotonic$ mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to $monotonic$ mechanisms may not just lower the revenue, but may in fact yield only a $negligible$ $fraction$ of the maximal revenue; more precisely, the revenue from monotonic mechanisms is no more than k times the simple revenue obtainable by selling the goods separately, or bundled (where k is the number of goods), whereas the maximal revenue may be arbitrarily larger. We then study the class of monotonic mechanisms and its subclass of allocation-monotonic mechanisms, and obtain useful characterizations and revenue bounds.
