论文标题
通过多数选票对优柔寡断的选择行为合理化
Rationalization of indecisive choice behavior by majoritarian ballots
论文作者
论文摘要
我们描述了一个模型，该模型可以解释可能是优柔寡断的选择行为，即准选择性（某些菜单上可能是空的选择对应关系）。此处的理由由一定比例的选票提供，这些选票是由任意二进制关系合理化的准选择性。如果从菜单中选择的所有选项都受到大于$ s $的投票的认可，我们将称为准选择性$ s $ s $ -joritarian。我们证明，所有形式的多数形式都等同于众所周知的行为特性，即切尔诺夫公理。然后，我们专注于两个多数主义的范式，从而简单的选票证明了准选择性的合理性，或者通过一次选票的认可（这是一个自由的理由）。这些基准解释通常需要不同的选票数量。我们确定自由理由的渐近最小规模。
We describe a model that explains possibly indecisive choice behavior, that is, quasi-choices (choice correspondences that may be empty on some menus). The justification is here provided by a proportion of ballots, which are quasi-choices rationalizable by an arbitrary binary relation. We call a quasi-choice $s$-majoritarian if all options selected from a menu are endorsed by a share of ballots larger than $s$. We prove that all forms of majoritarianism are equivalent to a well-known behavioral property, namely Chernoff axiom. Then we focus on two paradigms of majoritarianism, whereby either a simple majority of ballots justifies a quasi-choice, or the endorsement by a single ballot suffices - a liberal justification. These benchmark explanations typically require a different minimum number of ballots. We determine the asymptotic minimum size of a liberal justification.
