论文标题
多样性使朝着旅行者困境的合作迈进
Diversity enables the jump towards cooperation for the Traveler's Dilemma
论文作者
论文摘要
社会困境是集体福利与个人收获不符的情况。由于人类行为和游戏理论推理之间的冲突，一个被广泛研究的例子是旅行者的困境。困境依靠球员的动力来削弱对手，而牺牲了集体高薪。这种个人激励措施使玩家达到系统的相互削弱，直到达到最低的回报，这是游戏的独特NASH均衡。但是，如果玩家对高收益感到满意 - 不一定比对手的收益高 - 他们俩单独和集体都会更好。在这里，我们解释了如何将这种合作的高收益均衡收敛。我们的分析重点是将困境分解为本地和全球游戏。我们表明，玩家需要逃脱当地的最大化并跳入全球游戏，以达到合作平衡。使用动态方法，基于进化游戏理论和学习理论模型，我们发现多样性被理解为次优策略的存在，是使合作跳跃的一般机制。
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The dilemma relies on the players' incentive to undercut their opponent at the expense of losing a collective high payoff. Such individual incentive leads players to a systematic mutual undercutting until the lowest possible payoff is reached, which is the game's unique Nash equilibrium. However, if players were satisfied with a high payoff -- that is not necessarily higher than their opponent's -- they would both be better off individually and collectively. Here, we explain how it is possible to converge to this cooperative high payoff equilibrium. Our analysis focuses on decomposing the dilemma into a local and a global game. We show that players need to escape the local maximisation and jump to the global game, in order to reach the cooperative equilibrium. Using a dynamic approach, based on evolutionary game theory and learning theory models, we find that diversity, understood as the presence of suboptimal strategies, is the general mechanism that enables the jump towards cooperation.
