论文标题
跨链交换与偏好
Cross-chain Swaps with Preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
加密货币的极端估值和波动性要求投资者经常多样化，这需要安全的交换协议。跨链掉期协议允许不信任各方安全地交换其资产。但是，当前的模型和协议假设预定义的用户偏好以获得可接受的结果。本文提出了一个广义的掉期模型，允许各方在其传入和传出资产的子集上指定其偏好。它表明，现有的互换协议不一定是该模型中的较强的NASH均衡。它表征了具有安全，实时和强大的纳什均衡协议的交换图类别，并为此类别提供了这样的协议。此外，它表明，通过减少3SAT的减少，确定该类中的互换是否为NP-HARD，而进一步的是$σ_2^{\ Mathsf {p}} $ - 通过减少$ \ exists \ forall \ forall \ mathsf {dnf} $完成。
Extreme valuation and volatility of cryptocurrencies require investors to diversify often which demands secure exchange protocols. A cross-chain swap protocol allows distrusting parties to securely exchange their assets. However, the current models and protocols assume predefined user preferences for acceptable outcomes. This paper presents a generalized model of swaps that allows each party to specify its preferences on the subsets of its incoming and outgoing assets. It shows that the existing swap protocols are not necessarily a strong Nash equilibrium in this model. It characterizes the class of swap graphs that have protocols that are safe, live and a strong Nash equilibrium, and presents such a protocol for this class. Further, it shows that deciding whether a swap is in this class is NP-hard through a reduction from 3SAT, and further is $Σ_2^{\mathsf{P}}$-complete through a reduction from $\exists\forall\mathsf{DNF}$.
