论文标题
沉默的种类：管理金融市场自愿披露的声誉
The Kind of Silence: Managing a Reputation for Voluntary Disclosure in Financial Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
在连续的时间环境中，我们调查了公司的管理如何控制两个通用的自愿披露决策规则之间的动态选择：一个被称为$ \ it {tandid} $的全面透明披露规则，另一种称为$ \ it {sparing} $，在该值下，只有超过动态的threshold才能公开该值。我们展示了管理层如何获得坦率的声誉奖励。坦率的策略之所以昂贵，是因为备用替代方案屏蔽了企业在低价值披露后的潜在降级。我们展示了模型的参数，例如新闻强度，绩效付费和确定性限制的时间如何确定坦率策略与保留策略的最佳选择以及管理两者之间切换的最佳时间。管理层收到的私人新闻更新以泊松流程进行建模，该过程发生在固定的强制性披露日期（例如财政年度或四分之一）之间，并由背景黑色 - 智商的经济活动及其部分观察结果收到的新闻产生。呈现的模型基于非常简单的普通微分方程（ODE）的形式，该模型表征了分段确定的模型中的平衡，可从背景黑色choles模型中得出。结果表明，当新闻强度较低时，企业可以在整个过程中采用坦率的披露策略，但否则将在坦率的时期和对真相（或另一个方面的另一种方式）之间进行切换（替代）；也就是说，我们能够在平衡时表征坦率的公司将转向采用较高的策略。该模型说明了诸如强制性披露，新闻强度和绩效薪酬的时间等参数如何驱动此类切换行为。 $ \ it {带有\，常数\，pay \，for \，performance \，parameters，\ at \，most \，一个\，switching \，发生。} $
In a continuous-time setting we investigate how the management of a firm controls a dynamic choice between two generic voluntary disclosure decision rules: one with full and transparent disclosure termed $\it{candid}$, the other, termed $\it{sparing}$, under which values only above a dynamic threshold are disclosed. We show how management are rewarded with a reputational premium for candour. The candid strategy is costly because the sparing alternative shields the firm from potential downgrades following low value disclosures. We show how parameters of the model such as news intensity, pay-for-performance and time-to-mandatory-disclosure determine the optimal choice of candid versus sparing strategy and the optimal time for management to switch between the two. The private news updates received by management are modelled with a Poisson process, occurring between the fixed mandatory disclosure dates, such as fiscal years or quarters, with the news received generated by a background Black-Scholes model of economic activity and of its partial observation. The model presented develops a number of insights, based on a very simple ordinary differential equation (ODE) characterizing equilibrium in a piecewise-deterministic model, derivable from the background Black-Scholes model. It is shown that in equilibrium when news intensity is low a firm may employ a candid disclosure strategy throughout, but will otherwise switch (alternate) between periods of being candid and periods of being sparing with the truth (or the other way about); that is, we are able to characterize when in equilibrium a candid firm will switch to adopting a sparing strategy. The model illustrates how parameters such as time to mandatory disclosure, news intensity and pay-for-performance may drive such switching behaviour. $\it{With\,constant\,pay\,for\,performance\,parameters,\,at\,most\,one\, switching\,occurs.}$
