论文标题
离散和贝叶斯交易费用机制
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
论文作者
论文摘要
加密货币采用拍卖式交易费用机制（TFM）将交易分配给块，并确定矿工可以从交易中收取多少费用。几个不可能的结果表明，满足一组标准“良好”财产的TFM可获得低收入，在某些情况下根本没有收入。在这项工作中，我们通过表明所需的TFM属性是合理放松的情况来避免以前的不可能，简单的机制可以获得严格的阳性收入。通过离散费用，我们设计了满足扩展TFM Desiderata的TFM：它是策略与激励兼容（DSIC），近视矿工激励兼容（MMIC），侧扣合同（SCP）的优势（SCP），并在不适合分配的情况下（即均无目的），并在分配数字时（即均值），并获得了BIDS的局限性。如果我们不放弃DSIC和SCP的特性，而是表明比特币的TFM在应用启示原则后是贝叶斯激励兼容（BIC），MMIC，MMIC，Off-Chain-oferement（OCA）证明（OCA），并且大约是最佳收入。我们通过表征多项目OCA防止机制的类别来达到我们的结果，这可能具有独立的兴趣。
Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a standard set of "good" properties obtain low revenue, and in certain cases, no revenue at all. In this work, we circumvent previous impossibilities by showing that when desired TFM properties are reasonably relaxed, simple mechanisms can obtain strictly positive revenue. By discretizing fees, we design a TFM that satisfies the extended TFM desiderata: it is dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), side-contract-proof (SCP) and obtains asymptotically optimal revenue (i.e., linear in the number of allocated bids), and optimal revenue when considering separable TFMs. If instead of discretizing fees we relax the DSIC and SCP properties, we show that Bitcoin's TFM, after applying the revelation principle, is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), MMIC, off-chain-agreement (OCA) proof, and approximately revenue-optimal. We reach our results by characterizing the class of multi-item OCA-proof mechanisms, which may be of independent interest.
