论文标题
调整人口游戏中的策略修订率
Tuning Rate of Strategy Revision in Population Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们调查了人口游戏中的一个多代理决策问题，在该游戏中，人口中的每个代理商都做出了策略选择和修订，以与他人进行重复的游戏。策略修订会受到时间延迟的约束，这代表了代理商修改其策略所需花费的时间，然后才能采用新的策略并返回游戏。我们讨论了时间延迟对代理策略修订的长期行为的影响。特别是，当时间延迟很大时，策略修订将展示振荡，而代理商在不同策略之间“过渡”了大量时间，这阻止了代理人达到游戏的NASH平衡。作为本文的主要贡献，我们提出了一种调整代理策略修订率的算法，并显示这种调整方法可确保融合纳什平衡。我们使用模拟验证我们的分析结果。
We investigate a multi-agent decision problem in population games where each agent in a population makes a decision on strategy selection and revision to engage in repeated games with others. The strategy revision is subject to time delays which represent the time it takes for an agent revising its strategy needs to spend before it can adopt a new strategy and return back to the game. We discuss the effect of the time delays on long-term behavior of the agents' strategy revision. In particular, when the time delays are large, the strategy revision would exhibit oscillation and the agents spend substantial time in "transitioning" between different strategies, which prevents the agents from attaining the Nash equilibrium of the game. As a main contribution of the paper, we propose an algorithm that tunes the rate of the agents' strategy revision and show such tuning approach ensures convergence to the Nash equilibrium. We validate our analytical results using simulations.
