论文标题
在两方制度中政治两极分化的对称纳什均衡
Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system
论文作者
论文摘要
中位投票者假设（MVH）预测在多数选举期间，两个政党平台在一维政治范围内的融合。从MVH的角度来看，两极分化的解释是，每个选举都有不同的选民，因此一方不能同时取悦所有中位选民。我们考虑两个政党在一维范围内赢得选民，并假设每个一方在初选中提名一个候选人，而选举人仅代表整个人口的一方。我们认为，这四个候选人将通过最佳响应动态与总人口的中位数相同。
The median-voter hypothesis (MVH) predicts convergence of two party platforms across a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. From the viewpoint of the MVH, an explanation of polarization is that each election has a different median voter so that a party cannot please all the median voters at the same time. We consider two parties competing to win voters along a one-dimensional spectrum and assume that each party nominates one candidate out of two in the primary election, for which the electorates represent only one side of the whole population. We argue that all the four candidates will come to the same distance from the median of the total population through best-response dynamics.
