论文标题

部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测

Coalitional Game-Theoretical Approach to Coinvestment with Application to Edge Computing

论文作者

Patanè, Rosario, Araldo, Andrea, Chahed, Tijani, Kiedanski, Diego, Kofman, Daniel

论文摘要

我们在本文中提出了几个不同类型的利益相关者之间的共同投资计划,即物理网络所有者,操作网络节点,例如网络运营商或塔楼公司,以及一套愿意使用这些资源提供服务的服务提供商,作为视频流,增强现实,自动驾驶帮助等。一种情况是部署边缘计算资源。 确实,尽管后一种技术已经准备就绪,但此类资源的高资本支出(CAPEX)成本是其部署的障碍。因此,一个坚实的经济框架来指导投资和利益相关者的回报是解决此问题的关键。我们使用联盟游戏理论正式化了共同投资框架。我们提供了一种解决方案,以考虑其特征:交通负载,收入,公用事业功能,计算如何在利益相关者之间分配利润和成本。我们证明,通过证明我们的游戏是凸,总是有可能组成由所有利益相关者组成的大联盟。我们使用Shapley Value Concept获得了利益相关者的回报,并详细介绍了游戏的某些属性。我们在模拟中显示了解决方案。

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to use these resources to provide services as video streaming, augmented reality, autonomous driving assistance, etc. One such scenario is that of deployment of Edge Computing resources. Indeed, although the latter technology is ready, the high Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) cost of such resources is the barrier to its deployment. For this reason, a solid economical framework to guide the investment and the returns of the stakeholders is key to solve this issue. We formalize the coinvestment framework using coalitional game theory. We provide a solution to calculate how to divide the profits and costs among the stakeholders, taking into account their characteristics: traffic load, revenues, utility function. We prove that it is always possible to form the grand coalition composed of all the stakeholders, by showing that our game is convex. We derive the payoff of the stakeholders using the Shapley value concept, and elaborate on some properties of our game. We show our solution in simulation.

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