论文标题
侵略性的机制描述
Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions
论文作者
论文摘要
菜单描述在两个步骤中向玩家$ i $呈现机制。步骤（1）使用其他玩家的报告来描述$ i $的菜单：$ i $的潜在结果。步骤（2）使用$ i $的报告从她的菜单中选择$ i $的最爱结果。菜单描述可以更好地揭示策略性的不牺牲，而无需牺牲简单性吗？我们提出了一个新的简单菜单描述，以延期接受。我们证明，与其他常见的匹配机制相反，此菜单描述必须与相应的传统描述有很大不同。我们通过实验实验进行了两种基本机制的实验，这是菜单描述的希望和挑战。
A menu description presents a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses the reports of other players to describe $i$'s menu: the set of $i$'s potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from her menu. Can menu descriptions better expose strategyproofness, without sacrificing simplicity? We propose a new, simple menu description of Deferred Acceptance. We prove that -- in contrast with other common matching mechanisms -- this menu description must differ substantially from the corresponding traditional description. We demonstrate, with a lab experiment on two elementary mechanisms, the promise and challenges of menu descriptions.
