论文标题
两人随机游戏中的最佳响应动力学与相关的回报
Best-Response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑具有随机收益的有限两人普通表格游戏。玩家A的回报是I.I.D。来自均匀分布。给定p [0，1]，对于任何动作概况，玩家B的回报与player A的概率P的回报相吻合，并且是I.I.D.从相同的均匀分布，概率为1-P。该模型插入了I.I.D.的模型。大多数文献和随机潜在游戏的模型中都使用了随机收益。首先，我们研究上述游戏类别中纯纳什平衡的数量。然后，我们表明，对于任何正P，在可用动作的数量中均非最佳响应动力学达到纯NASH平衡，概率很高。
We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p and is i.i.d. from the same uniform distribution with probability 1-p. This model interpolates the model of i.i.d. random payoff used in most of the literature and the model of random potential games. First we study the number of pure Nash equilibria in the above class of games. Then we show that, for any positive p, asymptotically in the number of available actions, best response dynamics reaches a pure Nash equilibrium with high probability.
