论文标题
天然气存储中的团结：在危机时期，几个参与者中存储数量的潜在分配机制
Solidarity in natural gas storage: A potential allocation mechanism of stored quantities among several players during times of crisis
论文作者
论文摘要
最近在欧盟能源供应中遇到的干扰指出，供应危机构成了一个真正的线索，并且必须更好地准备成员国，以应对相关的挑战。根据当前的实践，成员国独立地填写了他们的天然气储藏量，虽然尚不清楚将来如何实施团结，即如何将一个或多个成员的累积储量重新分配以帮助有需要的人。在本文中，我们为潜在的团结框架提出了一些可能的准则，并正式化了游戏理论模型，以捕获问题的基本特征，考虑到与气体存储水平以及可能的传输瓶颈有关的未来条件的相关不确定性。拟议的供应安全与合作的机制是基于自愿参与的，可能有助于更有效地利用存储能力。通过计算模型，我们在一个简单的示例上演示了所提出的框架的操作，并证明在假设规避风险的参与者的假设下，该概念具有潜力。
The recently experienced disruptions in the EU's energy supply pointed out that supply crises pose a real thread and the member states must be better prepared do deal with the related challenges. According to the current practice, member states fill their gas storages independently, while it is not clear how solidarity could be put into practice in the future, i.e. how the accumulated reserves of one or more members may be potentially redistributed to help others in need. In this paper we propose some possible guidelines for a potential solidarity framework, and formalize a game-theoretic model in order to capture the basic features of the problem, considering the related uncertainty of the future conditions related to gas storage levels and possible transmission bottlenecks as well. The proposed mechanism of supply-security related cooperation is based on voluntary participation, and may contribute to the more efficient utilization of storage capacities. Via the computational model we demonstrate the operation of the proposed framework on a simple example and show that under the assumption of risk-averse participants, the concept exhibits potential.
