论文标题
单方面承诺的动态主要代理问题
A Dynamic Principal Agent Problem with One-sided Commitment
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们考虑了一个主要代理问题，允许代理人通过产生费用而退出。当当前的代理商退出工作时，校长将雇用一个新的，可能具有不同的类型。我们将主体的动态价值函数表征为在边界上可能是不连续的，是HJB方程的无限尺寸系统的（唯一）最小解，由代理的类型参数化。这个动态问题在某些意义上是一致的时间。 一些有趣的发现值得一提。首先，自我执行的合同通常是次优的。校长宁愿让代理商退出并雇用新的。接下来，由于我们的模型中存在不同类型的代理，因此承诺代理的标准合同也可能是次优的。校长可能不喜欢代理商的承诺，然后她可以通过设计合同来诱使当前的代理商退出，从而在以后从市场上雇用更便宜的承诺。此外，由于代理商的成本，校长只会有限地看到很多辞职。
In this paper we consider a principal agent problem where the agent is allowed to quit, by incurring a cost. When the current agent quits the job, the principal will hire a new one, possibly with a different type. We characterize the principal's dynamic value function, which could be discontinuous at the boundary, as the (unique) minimal solution of an infinite dimensional system of HJB equations, parametrized by the agent's type. This dynamic problem is time consistent in certain sense. Some interesting findings are worth mentioning. First, self-enforcing contracts are typically suboptimal. The principal would rather let the agent quit and hire a new one. Next, the standard contract for a committed agent may also be suboptimal, due to the presence of different types of agents in our model. The principal may prefer no commitment from the agent, then she can hire a cheaper one from the market at a later time by designing the contract to induce the current agent to quit. Moreover, due to the cost incurring to the agent, the principal will see only finitely many quittings.
