论文标题
Pikachu：通过使用Taproot将检查点进入比特币POW，从远程攻击中保护POS区块链
Pikachu: Securing PoS Blockchains from Long-Range Attacks by Checkpointing into Bitcoin PoW using Taproot
论文作者
论文摘要
基于可重复使用资源的区块链系统，例如验证证明（POS），比基于工作证明的系统提供了更弱的安全保证。具体来说，它们容易受到远程攻击的影响，在这种攻击中，对手可能会破坏先前的参与者，以重写链条的完整历史。为了防止对POS链的这种攻击，我们提出了一项协议，该协议将POS链状态检查到工作证明区块链（例如比特币）。因此，我们的检查点协议不依赖任何中央当局。我们的工作使用Schnorr签名和利用比特币最近的Taproot升级，从而使我们能够创建一个恒定大小的检查点交易。我们主张我们的协议的安全性，并提出了在比特币测试网络上测试的开源实现。
Blockchain systems based on a reusable resource, such as proof-of-stake (PoS), provide weaker security guarantees than those based on proof-of-work. Specifically, they are vulnerable to long-range attacks, where an adversary can corrupt prior participants in order to rewrite the full history of the chain. To prevent this attack on a PoS chain, we propose a protocol that checkpoints the state of the PoS chain to a proof-of-work blockchain such as Bitcoin. Our checkpointing protocol hence does not rely on any central authority. Our work uses Schnorr signatures and leverages Bitcoin recent Taproot upgrade, allowing us to create a checkpointing transaction of constant size. We argue for the security of our protocol and present an open-source implementation that was tested on the Bitcoin testnet.
