论文标题
防止在纸质招标中进行审核分配的折衷方案
Tradeoffs in Preventing Manipulation in Paper Bidding for Reviewer Assignment
论文作者
论文摘要
许多会议依靠纸质投标是其审阅者分配程序的关键组成部分。然后在分配审阅者时考虑这些投标，以帮助确保每个审查员都被分配给合适的论文。但是，尽管使用投标的好处，但依赖纸质招标可以使恶意审稿人以不道德的目的操纵纸质作业（例如，被分配到朋友的论文中）。已经提出和部署了几种防止这种操作的方法。在本文中，我们列举了某些理想的特性，即解决竞标操纵的算法应满足。然后，我们对各种方法以及未来研究的指示提供了高级分析。
Many conferences rely on paper bidding as a key component of their reviewer assignment procedure. These bids are then taken into account when assigning reviewers to help ensure that each reviewer is assigned to suitable papers. However, despite the benefits of using bids, reliance on paper bidding can allow malicious reviewers to manipulate the paper assignment for unethical purposes (e.g., getting assigned to a friend's paper). Several different approaches to preventing this manipulation have been proposed and deployed. In this paper, we enumerate certain desirable properties that algorithms for addressing bid manipulation should satisfy. We then offer a high-level analysis of various approaches along with directions for future investigation.
