论文标题
人才在组织中
Talent Hoarding in Organizations
论文作者
论文摘要
大多数组织依靠经理来确定才华横溢的工人。但是，对团队绩效进行评估的经理会激励ho积工人。这项研究提供了第一个经验证据，表明人才使用人员记录和大型公司的调查证据。人才ho积是由四分之三的经理人自我报告，可以在经理的工人人才评级中检测到，并且更频繁地发生在更强的ho积激励措施下，这是由与绩效相关的薪酬，团队规模和人才能见度所代理的。我使用准随机暴露于人才ho积，我表明，ho积会阻止内部工作申请，抑制职业发展并改变公司中的人才分配。
Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
