论文标题
社交媒体与民主
Social Media and Democracy
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究具有政治议程影响投票结果的社交媒体平台的能力。我们的基准是Condorcet的陪审团定理，该定理指出，多数投票下正确决定的可能性随选民人数增加。我们展示了社交媒体平台的信息操纵如何可以推翻陪审团定理，从而破坏民主。我们还表明，有时平台只能通过提供与其首选结果相反方向的信息来做到这一点。最后，我们将通过社交媒体对投票结果的操纵与传统媒体进行操纵进行了比较。
We study the ability of a social media platform with a political agenda to influence voting outcomes. Our benchmark is Condorcet's jury theorem, which states that the likelihood of a correct decision under majority voting increases with the number of voters. We show how information manipulation by a social media platform can overturn the jury theorem, thereby undermining democracy. We also show that sometimes the platform can do so only by providing information that is biased in the opposite direction of its preferred outcome. Finally, we compare manipulation of voting outcomes through social media to manipulation through traditional media.
