论文标题

在标准模型中,改进的基于晶格的环签名,具有不可显称的匿名性

An Improved Lattice-Based Ring Signature with Unclaimable Anonymity in the Standard Model

论文作者

Hu, Mingxing, Zhang, Weijiong, Liu, Zhen

论文摘要

戒指签名使用户能够代表一组任意的用户(称为戒指)签名消息,而无需透露该戒指的哪个成员实际生成了签名。签名者匿名性属性使环签名成为一个积极的研究主题。最近,Park and Sealfon(Crypto 19)提出了一个重要的匿名概念,名为Signer-Unclaimability,并在标准模型中构建了一个基于晶格的戒指签名方案,但它并未考虑不可原谅的W.R.T.对抗性选择的键攻击(签名的公共钥匙环可能包含由对手创建的密钥),并且签名大小在环和消息的大小中倍增。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种新的基于晶格的戒指签名方案,并在标准模型中具有不可显称的匿名性。特别是,我们的工作提高了公园和海豹工作的安全性和效率,这是不可原谅的W.R.T.对抗选择的键攻击,环签名大小在环大小中线性增长。

Ring signatures enable a user to sign messages on behalf of an arbitrary set of users, called the ring, without revealing exactly which member of that ring actually generated the signature. The signer-anonymity property makes ring signatures have been an active research topic. Recently, Park and Sealfon (CRYPTO 19) presented an important anonymity notion named signer-unclaimability and constructed a lattice-based ring signature scheme with unclaimable anonymity in the standard model, however, it did not consider the unforgeable w.r.t. adversarially-chosen-key attack (the public key ring of a signature may contain keys created by an adversary) and the signature size grows quadratically in the size of ring and message. In this work, we propose a new lattice-based ring signature scheme with unclaimable anonymity in the standard model. In particular, our work improves the security and efficiency of Park and Sealfons work, which is unforgeable w.r.t. adversarially-chosen-key attack, and the ring signature size grows linearly in the ring size.

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