论文标题
算法公平和垂直公平:IRS税收审计模型的收入公平性
Algorithmic Fairness and Vertical Equity: Income Fairness with IRS Tax Audit Models
论文作者
论文摘要
这项研究研究了在美国国税局(IRS)为税收审计选择的系统中,算法公平性问题。尽管算法公平的领域主要围绕着像个人一样对待的概念发展,但我们探索了垂直平等的概念 - 适当考虑个人之间的相关差异 - 这是许多公共政策环境中公平性的核心组成部分。垂直股权应用于美国个人所得税体系的设计,与不同收入水平的纳税人之间的税收和执法负担的公平分配有关。通过与财政部和IRS的独特合作,我们使用匿名个人纳税人微型数据,风险选择的审计以及2010 - 14年度的随机审计来研究税务管理的垂直平等。特别是,我们评估了现代机器学习方法选择审核的使用如何影响垂直权益。首先,我们展示了使用更灵活的机器学习(分类)方法(而不是简单的模型)如何将审计负担从高收入纳税人转移到中等收入纳税人。其次,我们表明,尽管现有的算法公平技术可以减轻跨收入的某些差异,但它们可能会产生巨大的绩效成本。第三,我们表明,是否将低报告的风险视为分类或回归问题的选择是高度的。从分类转变为回归模型,以预测不足的审计转变会大大向高收入人士转移,同时增加收入。最后,我们探讨了差异审核成本在塑造审计分配中的作用。我们表明,对回报的狭窄关注会破坏垂直权益。我们的结果对整个公共部门的算法工具的设计具有影响。
This study examines issues of algorithmic fairness in the context of systems that inform tax audit selection by the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS). While the field of algorithmic fairness has developed primarily around notions of treating like individuals alike, we instead explore the concept of vertical equity -- appropriately accounting for relevant differences across individuals -- which is a central component of fairness in many public policy settings. Applied to the design of the U.S. individual income tax system, vertical equity relates to the fair allocation of tax and enforcement burdens across taxpayers of different income levels. Through a unique collaboration with the Treasury Department and IRS, we use access to anonymized individual taxpayer microdata, risk-selected audits, and random audits from 2010-14 to study vertical equity in tax administration. In particular, we assess how the use of modern machine learning methods for selecting audits may affect vertical equity. First, we show how the use of more flexible machine learning (classification) methods -- as opposed to simpler models -- shifts audit burdens from high to middle-income taxpayers. Second, we show that while existing algorithmic fairness techniques can mitigate some disparities across income, they can incur a steep cost to performance. Third, we show that the choice of whether to treat risk of underreporting as a classification or regression problem is highly consequential. Moving from classification to regression models to predict underreporting shifts audit burden substantially toward high income individuals, while increasing revenue. Last, we explore the role of differential audit cost in shaping the audit distribution. We show that a narrow focus on return-on-investment can undermine vertical equity. Our results have implications for the design of algorithmic tools across the public sector.