论文标题
异质游戏中的歧视
Discrimination in Heterogeneous Games
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们考虑由不同类型的个人形成的有限人群进行的协调和反协调异质游戏，他们未能识别自己的类型但确实观察了对手的类型。我们表明，存在对称的纳什均衡状态，其中玩家根据他们在反协调游戏中面对的对手的类型来歧视不同的行为，而在协调游戏中则没有这种均衡。此外，歧视有一个限制：治疗不同的最大组数为三个。然后，我们根据某些特定的心理环境中人们观察到的行为讨论理论结果。
In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show that there exists symmetric Nash equilibria in which players discriminate by acting differently according to the type of opponent that they face in anti-coordination games, while no such equilibrium exists in coordination games. Moreover, discrimination has a limit: the maximum number of groups where the treatment differs is three. We then discuss the theoretical results in light of the observed behavior of people in some specific psychological contexts.
