论文标题
对称多人囚犯的不对称平衡困境超级游戏
Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Multiplayer Prisoners Dilemma Supergames
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为超级游戏提出了有限的自动机式解决方案概念。在我们的模型中，我们将平衡定义为状态开关的周期，而超级游戏是有限舞台游戏的状态的无限步行。我们表明，如果舞台游戏在本地不合作，并且随着有缺陷的代理的数量的增加，效用函数会单调降低，那么对称的多种囚犯的困境超级游戏必须包含一个对称平衡，并且可以包含不对称的平衡。
We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage game is locally non-cooperative, and the utility function is monotonously decreasing as the number of defective agents increases, the symmetric multiagent prisoners' dilemma supergame must contain one symmetric equilibrium and can contain asymmetric equilibria.
