论文标题
具有可衡量回报的重复游戏
Repeated Games with Tail-Measurable Payoffs
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究多人Blackwell游戏，这是重复的游戏，每个玩家的回报都是玩家在游戏过程中发挥的无限动作流的有限且可衡量的功能。这些游戏是David Gale和Frank Stewart（1953年）研究的两名玩家完美信息游戏的延伸。最近，已经发现了研究Blackwell游戏的各种新想法。在本文中，我们通过以四种不同的方式证明了具有有限数量的玩家，有限的动作集和可衡量的可衡量回报的Blackwell游戏，对这些想法进行了概述。
We study multiplayer Blackwell games, which are repeated games where the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite stream of actions played by the players during the game. These games are an extension of the two-player perfect-information games studied by David Gale and Frank Stewart (1953). Recently, various new ideas have been discovered to study Blackwell games. In this paper, we give an overview of these ideas by proving, in four different ways, that Blackwell games with a finite number of players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admit an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium, for all $\varepsilon>0$.
