论文标题
关于玩家能力对拥堵游戏的影响
On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了玩家能力对拥堵游戏中社会福利的影响。我们介绍了一款新游戏，即距离的网络拥塞游戏（DNC），作为我们研究的基础。 DNC是一种对称网络拥堵游戏，绑定了每个玩家可以使用的边缘数量。我们证明，与标准对称网络拥堵游戏相比，DNC是PLS完整的。在P.模拟不同的玩家功能中，我们建议在特定于域的语言（DSL）中使用程序来紧凑地表示玩家策略。我们将玩家的功能定义为他们可以使用的程序的最大大小。我们介绍了DNC的两个变体，其中包含代表策略空间的DSL。我们提出了四个能力偏好属性，以表征玩家能力对均衡的社会福利的影响。然后，在DNC变体的背景下，我们为这四个属性建立了必要和充分的条件。最后，我们研究了一款特定的游戏，在该游戏中，我们根据能力的界限来得出社会福利的精确表达。这提供了示例，即随着玩家变得越来越有能力，保持平衡的社会福利增加，保持不变或减少。
We study the impact of player capability on social welfare in congestion games. We introduce a new game, the Distance-bounded Network Congestion game (DNC), as the basis of our study. DNC is a symmetric network congestion game with a bound on the number of edges each player can use. We show that DNC is PLS-complete in contrast to standard symmetric network congestion games which are in P. To model different player capabilities, we propose using programs in a Domain-Specific Language (DSL) to compactly represent player strategies. We define a player's capability as the maximum size of the programs they can use. We introduce two variants of DNC with accompanying DSLs representing the strategy spaces. We propose four capability preference properties to characterize the impact of player capability on social welfare at equilibrium. We then establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the four properties in the context of our DNC variants. Finally, we study a specific game where we derive exact expressions of the social welfare in terms of the capability bound. This provides examples where the social welfare at equilibrium increases, stays the same, or decreases as players become more capable.
