论文标题
用算法定价
Pricing with algorithms
论文作者
论文摘要
本文在卖方选择算法的重复双重垄断模型中研究了马尔可夫的完美平衡。算法是从竞争对手的价格到自己的价格的映射。设置后，算法响应迅速。客户随机到达，也有机会修改算法。在具有两个可能价格的简单游戏中，垄断结果是利润功能的标准功能形式的独特均衡。更普遍的是，由于多种价格，市场权力的行使是规则 - 在所有平衡中，两个卖方的预期收益都高于竞争成果，至少一个卖方的卖方接近或高于垄断结果。这种勾结的维持似乎不在标准反托拉斯法律的范围之内，因为它不涉及任何直接沟通。
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly and so do opportunities to revise the algorithm. In the simple game with two possible prices, monopoly outcome is the unique equilibrium for standard functional forms of the profit function. More generally, with multiple prices, exercise of market power is the rule -- in all equilibria, the expected payoff of both sellers is above the competitive outcome, and that of at least one seller is close to or above the monopoly outcome. Sustenance of such collusion seems outside the scope of standard antitrust laws for it does not involve any direct communication.
