论文标题
公理特征草案规则
Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules
论文作者
论文摘要
草稿是在遵守某些优先顺序（例如，将球员的合同权利分配给专业体育联赛中的球队）的代理商中分配异质和不可分割的对象的顺序分配程序。代理报告对物体和捆绑包的顺序偏好是通过成对比较部分排序的。我们提供了一个简单的规则表征：它们是唯一尊重优先级（RP）的分配规则，最高为一个对象（EF1），非废物（NW）和资源单调（RM）。 RP和EF1对于体育联赛的竞争平衡至关重要。我们还证明了三个相关的不可能定理，表明竞争性平衡公理RP和EF1通常与策略防止性不相容。但是，草案规则满足了Maxmin策略 - 策略。如果代理可以声明某些对象不可接受，则规则草案的特征是RP，EF1，NW和RM与个人理性和截断不变性结合使用。在具有可变种群的模型中，草案规则的特征是EF1，EFF和RM，以及（人口）一致性，最高对象一致性和中立性。
Drafts are sequential allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues). Agents report ordinal preferences over objects and bundles are partially ordered by pairwise comparison. We provide a simple characterization of draft rules: they are the only allocation rules which are respectful of a priority (RP), envy-free up to one object (EF1), non-wasteful (NW) and resource monotonic (RM). RP and EF1 are crucial for competitive balance in sports leagues. We also prove three related impossibility theorems showing that the competitive-balance axioms RP and EF1 are generally incompatible with strategy-proofness. However, draft rules satisfy maxmin strategy-proofness. If agents may declare some objects unacceptable, then draft rules are characterized by RP, EF1, NW, and RM, in conjunction with individual rationality and truncation invariance. In a model with variable populations, draft rules are characterized by EF1, EFF, and RM, together with (population) consistency, top-object consistency, and neutrality.
