论文标题
反对对基于筏的物联网区块链网络的主动攻击
Countering Active Attacks on RAFT-based IoT Blockchain Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
本文考虑了由领导者节点和各种追随者节点组成的物体互联网(IoT)网络网络,这些网络共同实现了筏共识协议,以验证区块链事务,按照区块链客户端的要求。此外,由于附近有多个{\ it Active}恶意节点,在IoT区块链网络上考虑了两种类型的主动攻击,即堵塞和假冒。当物联网网络处于干扰攻击下时,我们使用随机几何工具来推导上行链路和下行链路IOT传输的覆盖概率的封闭形式表达式。另一方面,当物联网网络处于模仿攻击下时,我们提出了一种新方法,该方法使接收的IoT节点可以利用发射IoT节点的路径作为其指纹,以实现二进制假设测试来进行发送节点识别。为此,我们还提供了封闭形式的表达式,以解决错误警报,错过检测和错过分类的概率。最后,我们提出详细的仿真结果,这些结果表明以下内容:i)覆盖范围的概率随着夹具的位置从IoT网络移开,ii)三个错误概率随着链接质量的函数而降低。
This paper considers an Internet of Thing (IoT) blockchain network consisting of a leader node and various follower nodes which together implement the RAFT consensus protocol to verify a blockchain transaction, as requested by a blockchain client. Further, two kinds of active attacks, i.e., jamming and impersonation, are considered on the IoT blockchain network due to the presence of multiple {\it active} malicious nodes in the close vicinity. When the IoT network is under the jamming attack, we utilize the stochastic geometry tool to derive the closed-form expressions for the coverage probabilities for both uplink and downlink IoT transmissions. On the other hand, when the IoT network is under the impersonation attack, we propose a novel method that enables a receive IoT node to exploit the pathloss of a transmit IoT node as its fingerprint to implement a binary hypothesis test for transmit node identification. To this end, we also provide the closed-form expressions for the probabilities of false alarm, missed detection and miss-classification. Finally, we present detailed simulation results that indicate the following: i) the coverage probability improves as the jammers' locations move away from the IoT network, ii) the three error probabilities decrease as a function of the link quality.