论文标题
在不确定的联盟游戏中，概率强大的稳定分配
Probabilistically robust stabilizing allocations in uncertain coalitional games
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们考虑了具有不确定价值功能的多机构联盟游戏，我们为分配稳定性的可能性提供了无分配保证，即代理人没有激励措施从宏伟的联盟中进行缺陷，以形成对不确定参数的看不见实现的亚属性。如果一组稳定的分配，即游戏的所谓核心是空的，我们提出了对核心的随机放松。然后，我们证明那些属于这种放松的套装的分配可以伴随着稳定性的保证，可能会大致正确。最后，数值实验证实了我们的理论发现。
In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the grand coalition to form subcoalitions for unseen realizations of the uncertain parameter. In case the set of stable allocations, the so called core of the game, is empty, we propose a randomized relaxation of the core. We then show that those allocations that belong to this relaxed set can be accompanied by stability guarantees in a probably approximately correct fashion. Finally, numerical experiments corroborate our theoretical findings.
