论文标题
雷击网络中悲伤攻击的战略分析
Strategic Analysis of Griefing Attack in Lightning Network
论文作者
论文摘要
Lightning网络中的Hashed Timelock合同（HTLC）容易受到悲伤的攻击。攻击者可以通过安装此攻击来阻止几个渠道和失速支付。在经典的假设下，发现参与者是诚实或恶意的，但对于理性参与者而失败了，发现与悲伤的人（HTLC-GP）合同（HTLC-GP）是一种最先进的对抗及时的合同。为了解决差距，我们引入了一种游戏理论模型，用于分析HTLC中的悲伤攻击。我们使用此模型来分析HTLC-GP中的悲伤攻击，并猜想是不可能设计有效的协议，该协议将通过当前的比特币脚本系统惩罚恶意参与者。我们研究了罚款对攻击成本的影响，并观察到HTLC-GP在某些情况下抑制攻击者的障碍无效。为了进一步增加攻击成本，我们将\ emph {保证最低补偿}的概念介绍为$ζ$，并将HTLC-GP修改为$ \ textrm {htlc-gp}^ζ$。通过在闪电网络的多个实例上进行实验，我们观察到锁定网络中的总硬币降至$ \ textrm {htlc-gp}^ζ$的$ 28 \％$ $，与HTLC-GP不同，在HTLC-GP中，总锁定的锁定的锁定不到$ 40 \％$ $。这些结果证明$ \ textrm {htlc-gp}^ζ$比HTLC-GP更好，以应对攻击。
Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC) in Lightning Network is susceptible to a griefing attack. An attacker can block several channels and stall payments by mounting this attack. A state-of-the-art countermeasure, Hashed Timelock Contract with Griefing-Penalty (HTLC-GP) is found to work under the classical assumption of participants being either honest or malicious but fails for rational participants. To address the gap, we introduce a game-theoretic model for analyzing griefing attacks in HTLC. We use this model to analyze griefing attacks in HTLC-GP and conjecture that it is impossible to design an efficient protocol that will penalize a malicious participant with the current Bitcoin scripting system. We study the impact of the penalty on the cost of mounting the attack and observe that HTLC-GP is weakly effective in disincentivizing the attacker in certain conditions. To further increase the cost of attack, we introduce the concept of \emph{guaranteed minimum compensation}, denoted as $ζ$, and modify HTLC-GP into $\textrm{HTLC-GP}^ζ$. By experimenting on several instances of Lightning Network, we observe that the total coins locked in the network drops to $28\%$ for $\textrm{HTLC-GP}^ζ$, unlike in HTLC-GP where total coins locked does not drop below $40\%$. These results justify that $\textrm{HTLC-GP}^ζ$ is better than HTLC-GP to counter griefing attacks.
