论文标题
静脉攻击数据库的广泛威胁分析和通过融合比较分数的攻击检测
Extensive Threat Analysis of Vein Attack Databases and Attack Detection by Fusion of Comparison Scores
论文作者
论文摘要
在过去的十年中，关于手指和手静脉生物识别领域的演示攻击检测提出了许多巨大的贡献。在这些贡献中，人们能够找到各种不同的攻击数据库，这些数据库是私人或公开可用于研究界的。但是，并非总是显示使用的攻击样品是否具有实际欺骗现实的静脉识别系统的能力。受到以前的作品的启发，本研究提供了系统的威胁评估，包括三个公开可用的手指静脉攻击数据库和一个私人背静脉数据库。为此，14个不同的静脉识别方案面临攻击样本，然后将错误接受的攻击样本的百分比报告为冒名攻击介绍匹配率。作为第二步，使用得分水平融合将来自不同识别方案的比较分数与执行表现攻击检测的目标结合在一起。
The last decade has brought forward many great contributions regarding presentation attack detection for the domain of finger and hand vein biometrics. Among those contributions, one is able to find a variety of different attack databases that are either private or made publicly available to the research community. However, it is not always shown whether the used attack samples hold the capability to actually deceive a realistic vein recognition system. Inspired by previous works, this study provides a systematic threat evaluation including three publicly available finger vein attack databases and one private dorsal hand vein database. To do so, 14 distinct vein recognition schemes are confronted with attack samples and the percentage of wrongly accepted attack samples is then reported as the Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate. As a second step, comparison scores from different recognition schemes are combined using score level fusion with the goal of performing presentation attack detection.
