论文标题
间接互惠连续模型的二阶稳定性分析
A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity
论文作者
论文摘要
声誉是维持人类合作的关键机制之一，但是如果我们考虑因错误评估而无法达成共识的可能性，它的分析就会变得复杂。如果我们假设声誉和合作不采用二进制价值，而是具有连续的频谱，因此可以缓解难度，以便可以以扰动的方式分析对声誉的分歧。在这项工作中，我们通过将声誉的动态扩展到二阶扰动的二阶假设，即每个人最初都以良好的声誉合作，进行了分析。二阶理论阐明了图像评分与简单地持有对违反良好球员的侵犯的差异，应被认为是维持合作的好处。此外，主要八个领先的比较表明，如果两个未指定的球员之间的合作被认为是不好的，则有理惩罚的稳定效果会削弱。因此，我们的分析解释了简单的地位如何通过允许合理的惩罚以及忽略评估合作中无关的信息来实现高水平的稳定性。该观察结果表明，当声誉受到噪音的扰动时，哪些因素会影响社会规范的稳定性。
Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we assume that reputation and cooperation do not take binary values but have continuous spectra so that disagreement over reputation can be analysed in a perturbative way. In this work, we carry out the analysis by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation under the assumption that everyone initially cooperates with good reputation. The second-order theory clarifies the difference between Image Scoring and Simple Standing in that punishment for defection against a well-reputed player should be regarded as good for maintaining cooperation. Moreover, comparison among the leading eight shows that the stabilizing effect of justified punishment weakens if cooperation between two ill-reputed players is regarded as bad. Our analysis thus explains how Simple Standing achieves a high level of stability by permitting justified punishment and also by disregarding irrelevant information in assessing cooperation. This observation suggests which factors affect the stability of a social norm when reputation can be perturbed by noise.
