论文标题
阴影可能很危险:自然现象的隐形和有效的物理世界对抗攻击
Shadows can be Dangerous: Stealthy and Effective Physical-world Adversarial Attack by Natural Phenomenon
论文作者
论文摘要
估计对抗性示例的风险水平对于在现实世界中安全部署机器学习模型至关重要。物理世界攻击的一种流行方法是采用“贴纸”策略,但是遭受了某些局限性,包括难以访问目标或通过有效颜色打印。最近出现了一种新型的非侵入性攻击,试图通过基于光学的工具(例如激光束和投影仪)将扰动施加到目标上。但是,增加的光学模式是人造的,但不是自然的。因此,它们仍然是显着的和引人注目的,人类很容易注意到。在本文中,我们研究了一种新型的光学对抗示例,其中扰动是由非常常见的自然现象Shadow产生的,以实现在黑盒子环境下实现自然主义和隐秘的物理世界对抗性攻击。我们广泛评估了对模拟环境和现实环境的新攻击的有效性。交通信号识别的实验结果表明,我们的算法可以有效地产生对抗性示例,在LISA和GTSRB测试集上分别达到98.23%和90.47%的成功率,同时在现实情况下,在95%的时间内不断地误导了移动摄像机的95%。我们还提供了有关此攻击的局限性和防御机制的讨论。
Estimating the risk level of adversarial examples is essential for safely deploying machine learning models in the real world. One popular approach for physical-world attacks is to adopt the "sticker-pasting" strategy, which however suffers from some limitations, including difficulties in access to the target or printing by valid colors. A new type of non-invasive attacks emerged recently, which attempt to cast perturbation onto the target by optics based tools, such as laser beam and projector. However, the added optical patterns are artificial but not natural. Thus, they are still conspicuous and attention-grabbed, and can be easily noticed by humans. In this paper, we study a new type of optical adversarial examples, in which the perturbations are generated by a very common natural phenomenon, shadow, to achieve naturalistic and stealthy physical-world adversarial attack under the black-box setting. We extensively evaluate the effectiveness of this new attack on both simulated and real-world environments. Experimental results on traffic sign recognition demonstrate that our algorithm can generate adversarial examples effectively, reaching 98.23% and 90.47% success rates on LISA and GTSRB test sets respectively, while continuously misleading a moving camera over 95% of the time in real-world scenarios. We also offer discussions about the limitations and the defense mechanism of this attack.