论文标题
采购拍卖中的猜测
Speculation in Procurement Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
投机者可以通过在拍卖前获取要出售的物品来利用采购拍卖。然后可以在拍卖中行使累积的市场能力，并可能导致足够的收益来支付收购成本。我表明，猜测总是在第二价格拍卖中产生积极的预期利润，但在第一价拍卖中可能是无利可图的。在猜测在一价拍卖中有利可图的情况下，在第二价格拍卖中，它更有利可图。盈利能力的比较是由两种拍卖机制中不同竞争模式驱动的。就福利而言，投机会导致私人价值破坏并损害效率。卖方受益于投机者的收购要约。因此，猜测是以拍卖人为代价的。
A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I show that speculation always generates a positive expected profit in second-price auctions but could be unprofitable in first-price auctions. In the case where speculation is profitable in first-price auctions, it is more profitable in second-price auctions. This comparison in profitability is driven by different competition patterns in the two auction mechanisms. In terms of welfare, speculation causes private value destruction and harms efficiency. Sellers benefit from the acquisition offer made by the speculator. Therefore, speculation comes at the expense of the auctioneer.
