论文标题

探索权威证明的不公平:命令操纵攻击和补救措施

Exploring Unfairness on Proof of Authority: Order Manipulation Attacks and Remedies

论文作者

Wang, Qin, Li, Rujia, Wang, Qi, Chen, Shiping, Xiang, Yang

论文摘要

权力证明(POA)是与固定委员会的一种许可共识算法。 POA由于其表现更好和更快的结局而被社区和行业广泛采用。在本文中,我们探讨了当前POA实现中存在的\ textit {不公平}问题。我们已经调查了2,500+ \ textit {在野外}项目中,并选择了10+作为我们的主要重点(涵盖以太坊,binance智能链等)。我们已经确定了两种类型的订单操作攻击,以分别打破事务级别(又称交易订购)和块级(密封剂位置订购)的公平性。他们俩都仅依靠诚实,但\ textit {procitable}密封剂假设而没有修改原始设置。我们在孤立的环境下对分叉分支机构发动了这些攻击,并仔细评估了针对不同实现的攻击范围。迄今为止(截至2021年11月),潜在受影响的POA市值可达到681,0.87美元。此外,我们进一步深入研究了所选项目的源代码,因此,提出了有关修复程序的建议。据《最好的知识》,这项工作提供了POA算法中\ textit {不公平}问题的首次探索。

Proof of Authority (PoA) is a type of permissioned consensus algorithm with a fixed committee. PoA has been widely adopted by communities and industries due to its better performance and faster finality. In this paper, we explore the \textit{unfairness} issue existing in the current PoA implementations. We have investigated 2,500+ \textit{in the wild} projects and selected 10+ as our main focus (covering Ethereum, Binance smart chain, etc.). We have identified two types of order manipulation attacks to separately break the transaction-level (a.k.a. transaction ordering) and the block-level (sealer position ordering) fairness. Both of them merely rely on honest-but-\textit{profitable} sealer assumption without modifying original settings. We launch these attacks on the forked branches under an isolated environment and carefully evaluate the attacking scope towards different implementations. To date (as of Nov 2021), the potentially affected PoA market cap can reach up to $681,087$ million USD. Besides, we further dive into the source code of selected projects, and accordingly, propose our recommendation for the fix. To the best of knowledge, this work provides the first exploration of the \textit{unfairness} issue in PoA algorithms.

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