论文标题
两次攻击了遗嘱证明鬼魂/以太坊
Two Attacks On Proof-of-Stake GHOST/Ethereum
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了针对销售证明（POS）以太坊共识方案的两次攻击。第一次攻击表明，POS与POS Enerereum使用的贪婪最重的子树（Ghost）叉子选择范式之间的基本概念不相容。简而言之，POS允许具有消失股份的对手产生无限数量的等效块。虽然大多数等式的块将是孤儿，但这种孤立的“叔叔块”仍然影响着幽灵范式下的叉子选择，从而赋予了对规范链的对手毁灭性的控制。虽然当前POS以太坊的最新消息驱动（LMD）方面阻止了此攻击的直接应用，但我们的第二次攻击表明，如何专门利用LMD来获得平衡攻击的新变体，该攻击克服了最近的协议添加，该协议添加旨在减轻平衡型攻击。因此，以目前的形式，没有LMD的POS以太坊分别容易受到我们的第一次和第二次攻击。
We present two attacks targeting the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum consensus protocol. The first attack suggests a fundamental conceptual incompatibility between PoS and the Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree (GHOST) fork choice paradigm employed by PoS Ethereum. In a nutshell, PoS allows an adversary with a vanishing amount of stake to produce an unlimited number of equivocating blocks. While most equivocating blocks will be orphaned, such orphaned `uncle blocks' still influence fork choice under the GHOST paradigm, bestowing upon the adversary devastating control over the canonical chain. While the Latest Message Driven (LMD) aspect of current PoS Ethereum prevents a straightforward application of this attack, our second attack shows how LMD specifically can be exploited to obtain a new variant of the balancing attack that overcomes a recent protocol addition that was intended to mitigate balancing-type attacks. Thus, in its current form, PoS Ethereum without and with LMD is vulnerable to our first and second attack, respectively.
