论文标题
与用户身份验证
Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Secure Direct Communication with User Authentication
论文作者
论文摘要
量子安全直接通信（QSDC）和确定性的安全量子通信（DSQC）是量子加密的两个重要分支，其中一个可以在不通过先前键加密的情况下安全地传输秘密消息。在实际情况下，对手可以应用探测器侧通道攻击，以获取有关秘密消息的一些不可忽略的信息。测量设备独立的（MDI）量子协议可以通过引入不信任的第三方（UTP）来消除这种检测器侧通道攻击，后者在协议期间使用不完善的测量设备执行所有测量。在本文中，我们提出了第一个具有用户身份身份验证的MDI-QSDC协议，在该协议中，发送者和接收者都首先检查对方的真实性，然后交换秘密消息。然后，我们将其扩展到MDI量子对话（QD）协议，双方在验证另一方的身份后可以发送各自的秘密消息。除此之外，我们还报告了使用用户身份身份验证的第一个MDI-DSQC协议。理论分析证明了我们提出的协议针对常见攻击的安全性。
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) and deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC) are two important branches of quantum cryptography, where one can transmit a secret message securely without encrypting it by a prior key. In the practical scenario, an adversary can apply detector-side-channel attacks to get some non-negligible amount of information about the secret message. Measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum protocols can remove this kind of detector-side-channel attack, by introducing an untrusted third party (UTP), who performs all the measurements during the protocol with imperfect measurement devices. In this paper, we put forward the first MDI-QSDC protocol with user identity authentication, where both the sender and the receiver first check the authenticity of the other party and then exchange the secret message. Then we extend this to an MDI quantum dialogue (QD) protocol, where both the parties can send their respective secret messages after verifying the identity of the other party. Along with this, we also report the first MDI-DSQC protocol with user identity authentication. Theoretical analyses prove the security of our proposed protocols against common attacks.
