论文标题
关于学校选择中平权行动的渐近表现
On the Asymptotic Performance of Affirmative Actions in School Choice
论文作者
论文摘要
本文在学校选择竞赛中分析了两种流行的平权行动政策，多数配额和少数族裔储备的渐近表现，多数配额和少数民族储备和最高交易周期机制（TTCM）的渐近表现。当所有学生都真诚时，这两个肯定行动的匹配结果在IAM下是渐变的。鉴于IAM下的可能的偏好操作，我们以这两种肯定的作用来表征IAM的渐近等效的NASH平衡结果集。但是，这两个肯定的行动在TTCM下引起了不同的匹配结果，即使在大型市场中，也具有不可忽略的概率。
This paper analyzes the asymptotic performance of two popular affirmative action policies, majority quota and minority reserve, under the immediate acceptance mechanism (IAM) and the top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in the contest of school choice. The matching outcomes of these two affirmative actions are asymptotically equivalent under the IAM when all students are sincere. Given the possible preference manipulations under the IAM, we characterize the asymptotically equivalent sets of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the IAM with these two affirmative actions. However, these two affirmative actions induce different matching outcomes under the TTCM with non-negligible probability even in large markets.
