论文标题
抗Sybil和分散的市场
A Sybil-Resistant and Decentralized Market Place
论文作者
论文摘要
现有的集中市场（例如eBay）使公司能够收集大量可用于操纵用户的个人数据。此外，用户可以经常在没有严重后果的情况下进行欺诈。声誉系统仅在部分地解决此问题，因为恶意用户的声誉太低，可以通过新的身份重新加入网络。通过进行Sybil攻击，即与多种看似截然不同的身份一起加入，恶意参与者可以进一步提高自己的声誉。在本文中，我们介绍了MarketPalace。 MarketPalace依靠点对点基础设施在交易期间实现分散的市场。只有在注册时，用户才能与中央服务器进行通信以验证他们不是Sybils。更具体地说，我们的系统利用自我主张的身份来检测和破坏同一用户重复加入。我们实施了MarketPalace，并证明了其对小区域市场的可行性。
Existing centralised market places such as Ebay enable companies to gather large amounts of personal data that can be used to manipulate users. Furthermore, users can frequently perform fraud without severe consequence. Reputation systems only solve this problem partially as malicious users can re-join the network with a new identity if their reputation is too low. By performing a Sybil attack, i.e., joining with multiple seemingly distinct identities, malicious participants can further boost their own reputation. In this paper, we present MarketPalace. MarketPalace relies on a peer-to-peer infrastructure to realize a decentralized market place during trading. Only when registering, users communicate with a central server to verify that they are not Sybils. More concretely, our system leverages self-sovereign identity to detect and undermine repeated joins by the same user. We implemented MarketPalace and demonstrated its feasibility for small regional markets.
