论文标题
网络游戏的组成部分迈尔森的价值
The component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for Network Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了网络游戏的组成部分迈尔森的价值。这个新值是Myerson值和组成部分平等除法规则的凸组合是基于玩家的分配规则。在合作框架下的网络游戏中，迈尔森的价值是边缘主义的极端例子，而平等的划分规则则表示平等主义。在拟议的组成部分的平均迈尔森价值中，凸度参数结合了这两个属性，并确定了对玩家的团结程度。在这里，由于团结，我们的意思是网络中玩家之间的相互支持或补偿。我们提供了该值的三个公理表征。此外，我们提出了一个在子游戏中纳什均衡下的组件平均值迈尔森价值的实施机制。
We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under the cooperative framework, the Myerson value is an extreme example of marginalism, while the equal division rule signifies egalitarianism. In the proposed component-wise egalitarian Myerson value, a convexity parameter combines these two attributes and determines the degree of solidarity to the players. Here, by solidarity, we mean the mutual support or compensation among the players in a network. We provide three axiomatic characterizations of the value. Further, we propose an implementation mechanism for the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value under subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
