论文标题
机制设计和信息惩罚
Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment
论文作者
论文摘要
我们将\ emph {信息惩罚}介绍给与外源性现状机制竞争的机制的设计：玩家可以以某种延迟发送乱码的公共信息，而其他人则不能忽略它们。最佳信息惩罚可以确保完全参与无损失，即使任何单人都可以公开执行现状机制。信息惩罚允许使用标准启示原则，独立于该机理设计师的目标，并且仅在平衡路径上运行。改进和适用于知情的主要设置是强大的。我们提供的条件使机会主义信号设计师变得强大。
We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal designers.
