论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Using Non-Stationary Bandits for Learning in Repeated Cournot Games with Non-Stationary Demand
论文作者
论文摘要
过去的许多尝试建模重复的欧司诺(Cournot)游戏假设需求是静止的。这与现实情况不一致,在这些情况下,由于多种原因,市场需求可以在产品的一生中不断发展。在本文中,我们对具有非平稳需求的重复欧洲杯游戏建模,以使公司/代理人面临非平稳的多军强盗问题的单独实例。代理可以选择的一组武器/动作代表离散的生产量;在这里,订购了动作空间。代理人是独立的和自主的,无法从环境中观察到任何东西。他们只能在采取行动后看到自己的奖励,而只能致力于最大化这些奖励。我们提出了一种新颖的算法“具有加权探索的自适应(AWE)$ε$ -GREDY”,该算法是基于众所周知的$ε$ - 绿色方法。该算法检测并量化了由于市场需求的变化而导致的奖励变化,并且与需求变化程度成比例地不同,学习率和勘探速度变化,从而使代理人能够更好地识别新的最佳动作。为了高效的探索,它还部署了一种权衡利用有序动作空间的动作的机制。我们使用模拟研究市场中各种均衡的出现。此外,我们以系统中总体数量和动作空间的大小来研究方法的可伸缩性。我们在模型中考虑对称和不对称公司。我们发现,使用我们提出的方法,代理可以根据需求的变化来迅速改变其行动方案,并且他们在许多模拟中也从事犯罪行为。
Many past attempts at modeling repeated Cournot games assume that demand is stationary. This does not align with real-world scenarios in which market demands can evolve over a product's lifetime for a myriad of reasons. In this paper, we model repeated Cournot games with non-stationary demand such that firms/agents face separate instances of non-stationary multi-armed bandit problem. The set of arms/actions that an agent can choose from represents discrete production quantities; here, the action space is ordered. Agents are independent and autonomous, and cannot observe anything from the environment; they can only see their own rewards after taking an action, and only work towards maximizing these rewards. We propose a novel algorithm 'Adaptive with Weighted Exploration (AWE) $ε$-greedy' which is remotely based on the well-known $ε$-greedy approach. This algorithm detects and quantifies changes in rewards due to varying market demand and varies learning rate and exploration rate in proportion to the degree of changes in demand, thus enabling agents to better identify new optimal actions. For efficient exploration, it also deploys a mechanism for weighing actions that takes advantage of the ordered action space. We use simulations to study the emergence of various equilibria in the market. In addition, we study the scalability of our approach in terms number of total agents in the system and the size of action space. We consider both symmetric and asymmetric firms in our models. We found that using our proposed method, agents are able to swiftly change their course of action according to the changes in demand, and they also engage in collusive behavior in many simulations.