论文标题
商人：通过激励措施避免付款渠道耗尽
The Merchant: Avoiding Payment Channel Depletion through Incentives
论文作者
论文摘要
支付通道网络通过执行交易\ emph {Off-Chain}大大提高了区块链的吞吐量和可扩展性。在非链付款中，各方将硬币存入渠道，然后进行交易，而无需调用区块链的全球共识机制。但是，交易值受通道的容量，即通道上可用的资金量的限制。当发送交易并在通道上收到交易时，这些资金会减少并增加。最近的研究表明，发送和接收交易之间存在不平衡，这导致渠道耗尽，因为这些操作之一由于缺乏可用的资金而变得不可能随着时间的流逝而变得不可能。 我们通过费用激励付款渠道的平衡使用。尽管当前的费用模型仅取决于交易价值，但我们的费用政策鼓励交易对渠道的平衡产生积极影响并阻止那些具有负面影响的交易。本文首先定义了费用策略的必要特性。然后，它引入了两种新颖的费用策略，这些策略可满足所有必要的特性。我们广泛的仿真研究表明，这些激励措施将付款的效率提高到$ 8 \％$ $ 19 \％$。
Payment channels networks drastically increase the throughput and hence scalability of blockchains by performing transactions \emph{off-chain}. In an off-chain payment, parties deposit coins in a channel and then perform transactions without invoking the global consensus mechanism of the blockchain. However, the transaction value is limited by the capacity of the channel, i.e., the amount of funds available on a channel. These funds decrease when a transaction is sent and increase when a transaction is received on the channel. Recent research indicates that there is an imbalance between sending and receiving transactions, which leads to channel depletion in the sense that one of these operations becomes impossible over time due to the lack of available funds. We incentivize the balanced use of payment channels through fees. Whereas the current fee model depends solely on the transaction value, our fee policies encourage transactions that have a positive effect on the balance in a channel and discourage those that have a negative effect. This paper first defines necessary properties of fee strategies. Then, it introduces two novel fees strategies that provably satisfy all necessary properties. Our extensive simulation study reveals that these incentives increase the effectiveness of payments by $8\%$ to $19\%$.
