论文标题
将Deutsch的良好解释概念应用于人工智能和神经科学 - 最初的探索
Applying Deutsch's concept of good explanations to artificial intelligence and neuroscience -- an initial exploration
论文作者
论文摘要
自从深度学习革命以来,人工智能取得了长足的进步,但是AI系统仍然很难推断其培训数据并适应新情况。为了启发,我们研究了科学领域,科学家已经能够发展出表现出非凡的能力来推断并有时预测以前从未观察到的现象的存在的能力。根据戴维·德意志(David Deutsch)的说法,这种推断称为“触及”,是由于科学理论很难改变。在这项工作中,我们调查了德意志的难以多种原则,以及它如何与深度学习中更正式的原则有关,例如偏见差异权衡和Occam的剃须刀。我们区分内部变异性,在内部可以改变模型/理论的数量,同时仍会产生相同的预测,外部可变性,这就是必须将模型的数量变化以准确预测新的新的,分布的数据。我们讨论了如何使用Rashomon集的大小以及如何使用Kolmogorov复杂性来衡量内部变异性。我们探讨了通过观察人脑并区分大脑中的两个学习系统,在智力中探讨了什么作用。第一个系统的运行类似于深度学习,可能是大多数感知和运动控制的基础,而第二个系统是一种更具创造力的系统,能够生成世界上难以自大的解释。我们认为,弄清楚如何复制第二个能够产生难以自我解释的系统是一个关键的挑战,需要解决以实现人工通用智能。我们与Popperian认识论的框架接触,该框架拒绝归纳,并断言知识产生是一个进化过程,它是通过猜想和反驳进行的。
Artificial intelligence has made great strides since the deep learning revolution, but AI systems still struggle to extrapolate outside of their training data and adapt to new situations. For inspiration we look to the domain of science, where scientists have been able to develop theories which show remarkable ability to extrapolate and sometimes predict the existence of phenomena which have never been observed before. According to David Deutsch, this type of extrapolation, which he calls "reach", is due to scientific theories being hard to vary. In this work we investigate Deutsch's hard-to-vary principle and how it relates to more formalized principles in deep learning such as the bias-variance trade-off and Occam's razor. We distinguish internal variability, how much a model/theory can be varied internally while still yielding the same predictions, with external variability, which is how much a model must be varied to accurately predict new, out-of-distribution data. We discuss how to measure internal variability using the size of the Rashomon set and how to measure external variability using Kolmogorov complexity. We explore what role hard-to-vary explanations play in intelligence by looking at the human brain and distinguish two learning systems in the brain. The first system operates similar to deep learning and likely underlies most of perception and motor control while the second is a more creative system capable of generating hard-to-vary explanations of the world. We argue that figuring out how replicate this second system, which is capable of generating hard-to-vary explanations, is a key challenge which needs to be solved in order to realize artificial general intelligence. We make contact with the framework of Popperian epistemology which rejects induction and asserts that knowledge generation is an evolutionary process which proceeds through conjecture and refutation.