论文标题
情绪的类型和强度如何影响谣言传播
How the emotion's type and intensity affect rumor spreading
论文作者
论文摘要
在谣言传播中，情绪的含义和传染效果不可忽视。本文阐明了DMS'smotional类型和强度如何影响谣言扩散。基于RDEU和进化游戏的理论，我们通过考虑情绪来构建一种谣言传播的进化游戏模型，该模型将网民和政府作为核心主题。通过MATLAB模拟并揭示了DMS'smotional类型和强度对谣言扩散的影响机制。结果表明，策略的DMS'Choice不仅受到自己的情感偏好和强度的影响，而且还受到谣言传播的其他参与者的影响。悲观主义对进化游戏的稳定性比乐观主义更为重要，政府的情绪类型对游戏结果比网民更敏感，并且情感强度与进化速度成正比。更重要的是，发现了一些重要的情感阈值，可以用来预测网民的行为，帮助政府获得关键时间来处理谣言并避免塔西斯陷阱危机。此外，模拟结果总结为五种类型：风险，机会，理想，安全和反对。我们希望这项工作对政府的公共治理有益。
The implication and contagion effect of emotion cannot be ignored in rumor spreading. This paper sheds light on how DMs'emotional type and intensity affect rumor spreading. Based on the theory of RDEU and evolutionary game, we construct an evolutionary game model of rumor spreading by considering emotions, which takes netizens and the government as the core subjects. Through MATLAB to simulate and reveal the influencing mechanism of DMs'emotional type and intensity on rumor spreading. The results indicate that the DMs'choice of strategy is not only affected by their own emotional preference and intensity but also affected by that of the other player in rumor spreading. Pessimism has a more significant influence on the stability of the evolutionary game than optimism, the government's emotion types are more sensitive to the game results than netizens, and the emotional intensity is proportional to the evolution speed. More importantly, some significant emotional thresholds are found, which can be used to predict the behavior of netizens, helping the government gain critical time to deal with rumors and avoid the Tacitus Trap crisis. Furthermore, the simulation results are summarized as five types: risk, opportunity, ideal, security, and opposition. We hope that this work is beneficial to the government's public governance.
