论文标题
因果关系的反事实定义
The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation
论文作者
论文摘要
在与Joost Vennekens的先前工作中，我提出了基于某些合理原则的实际因果关系的定义，从而允许有关因果关系的辩论，从而将其大量关注的重点转移到了示例上，转向了更系统的分析。本文通过两种方式对分析做出了贡献。首先，我表明我们的定义实际上是对赖特著名的因果关系定义的形式化，结合了反事实的差异条件。这意味着我们的定义整合了两种高度影响力的因果关系，这些方法被认为是相互对立的。其次，我修改了我们的定义以提供实质性的改进：我以避免对抢先案件的有问题分析的方式削弱了差异条件。结果对因果关系的定义形成了反事实方法与NESS方法之间的自然折衷。
In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach.
