论文标题
问责制和动力
Accountability and Motivation
论文作者
论文摘要
我们建立了一个正式的模型，该模型研究了不同的政策制定环境如何塑造职业界官员的改革决策和实施。当职业问题强烈时，官员将无效地进行改革，向中央政府发出一致的信号。为了提高改革政策的质量，中央政府必须使官员对政策结果负责。我们证明，中央政府可以通过要求官员宣传政策成果，同时维持实施细节的保密，从而行使这一问责制。在这种情况下，官员只能通过理想的政策结果来表明他们的一致性，因此他们很有动力进行改革。我们还证明，在替代决策环境下，对政策结果的责任是不可行的。我们将结果应用于中国最近在分散改革决策方面的实践。
We build a formal model that examines how different policymaking environments shape career-concerned officials' reform decisions and implementation. When career concerns are strong, officials will inefficiently initiate reforms to signal to the central government that they are congruent. To improve the quality of reform policymaking, the central government must hold officials accountable to policy outcomes. We demonstrate that the central government can exercise this accountability by requiring officials to publicize policy outcomes while maintain secrecy on implementation details. In this situation, officials can signal their congruence only through a desirable policy outcome, so they are highly motivated to carry out a reform well. We also demonstrate that the accountability on policy outcomes is infeasible under alternative policymaking environments. We apply the results to China's recent practice in decentralized reform policymaking.
